ISET hosted a Research Seminar featuring Saba Devdariani, Researcher at the University of Barcelona, Ph.D. in Economics from the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), and an alumnus of ISET’s MA in Economics program. The seminar was part of the ISET Research Seminar Series, organized by ISET’s resident faculty. He presented his research titled “External Shocks and Anticipatory Pandering.”
The study examines how politicians’ advance knowledge of external shocks, such as economic downturns or commodity price fluctuations, influences their incentives to adopt policies favored by voters, even when alternative decisions may better serve the public interest. Building on the accountability model developed by Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts, the research demonstrates that the effects of anticipation vary depending on the magnitude and direction of the shock. While anticipation eliminates incentives for pandering in cases of very large or very small shocks, moderate negative shocks can turn pandering into a “gamble for resurrection,” while moderate positive shocks can make it a form of electoral insurance.
The findings further suggest that although politicians’ foresight can reduce unnecessary pandering and improve political selection, it ultimately lowers overall voter welfare. The seminar provided an opportunity to discuss the implications of external shocks for political accountability, electoral incentives, and voter welfare.
